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Abstract Overcoming environmental challenges requires
understanding when and why individuals adopt cooperative
behaviors, how individual behaviors and interactions
among resource users change over time, and how group
structure and group dynamics impact behaviors, institu-
tions, and resource conditions. Cultural multilevel selection
(CMLS) is a theoretical framework derived from theories
of cultural evolution and cultural group selection that
emphasizes pressures affecting different levels of social
organization as well as conflicts among these levels. As
such, CMLS can be useful for understanding many envi-
ronmental challenges. With this paper, we use evidence
from the literature and hypothetical scenarios to show how
the framework can be used to understand the emergence
and persistence of sustainable social–ecological systems.
We apply the framework to the Balinese system of rice
production and focus on two important cultural traits
(synchronized cropping and the institutions and rituals
associated with water management). We use data from the
literature that discusses bottom-up (self-organized, com-
plex adaptive system) and top-down explanations for the
system and discuss how (1) the emergence of group
structure, (2) group-level variation in cropping strategies,
institutions, and rituals, and (3) variation in overall yields
as a result of different strategies and institutions, could
have allowed for the spread of group-beneficial traits and
the increasing complexity of the system. We also outline
cultural transmission mechanisms that can explain the
spread of group-beneficial traits in Bali and describe the
kinds of data that would be required to validate the
framework in forward-looking studies.
Keywords Social–ecological systems  Cultural multilevel
selection  Common pool resource  Cultural transmission 
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Introduction
Environmental challenges, including the sustainable man-
agement of common pool resources (CPR), share three
features. First, they are often the result of social dilemmas,
or situations in which the interests of the individual conflict
with those of the group (Gardner and Stern 1996). Second,
they are dynamic; individuals and institutions must adapt to
social and environmental conditions creating feedback
loops between social and ecological systems. Third, envi-
ronmental challenges are often embedded in social–eco-
logical systems containing multiple groups and exhibiting
hierarchical group structure (e.g., households, villages,
communities, state/regional governments, etc.) (Ostrom
2010). Given these features, overcoming environmental
challenges requires understanding when and why individ-
uals adopt cooperative behaviors to overcome social
dilemmas, how individual behaviors and interactions
among resource users change over time, and how group
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structure and dynamics (including competition within and
between levels in a nested hierarchy) impact the coevolu-
tion of behaviors, institutions, and resource conditions.
There has been extensive research on the conditions that
enable sustainable CPR management (Agrawal 2003;
Ostrom 2009), and numerous conceptual and analytical
frameworks have been used to structure our understanding
of human-environmental systems and their governance
[e.g., resilience (Folke 2006), social–ecological systems
(Ostrom 2009), coupled human and natural systems (Liu
2007), multilevel governance frameworks (Pahl-Wostl
2009)]. However, generalizable insights into the causal
mechanisms affecting change across organizational levels
have been elusive (Waring et al. 2015). Such insights are
critical for improving our understanding of when and how
sustainable social–ecological systems emerge and persist.
Here, we aim to demonstrate that a cultural multilevel
selection framework can provide important insights about
the evolution of social–ecological systems.
Cultural multilevel selection (CMLS) is a theoretical
framework that focuses on cultural evolutionary processes
(e.g., variation, selection, transmission) occurring when
human populations are structured in social groups (Boyd and
Richerson 1985; Wilson and Wilson 2007). CMLS empha-
sizes not only the pressures affecting groups at different
levels of social organization, but also the importance of
understanding conflict among these levels. For example,
individuals are embedded within kin groups, which are
embedded within societies, but the interests of individuals,
kin groups, and societies are not always aligned (Reyes-
Garcı´a et al. 2016). CMLS might be particularly useful for
understanding environmental challenges that require repe-
ated cooperative acts of many individuals, sometimes from
socially distinct and geographically distant groups. By
applying evolutionary concepts that focus on adaptive
change to group structure, CMLS can help us better under-
stand how, when, and where solutions to environmental
social dilemmas emerge and proliferate (Waring et al. 2015).
However, the application of the CMLS framework to
environmental challenges is its infancy. As such, our pri-
mary objectives are: (1) to demonstrate how to apply the
CMLS framework to understand the dynamics of a sus-
tainable social–ecological system, (2) to outline the causal
mechanisms that could have contributed to the emergence
and spread of collective action in this system, and (3) to
highlight the data that would be required to fully test
hypotheses derived from the CMLS framework about the
evolution of social–ecological systems. To meet these
objectives, we re-examine the classic agro-ecological sys-
tem in Bali.
Bali is well-known for a characteristic, ritualized system
of rice production (Geertz 1980; Lansing 2006; Wittfogel
1957) that allows farmers to navigate environmental
tradeoffs and constraints (Hakim et al. 2009). The con-
struction of irrigation canals and the existence of nested
institutions for coordinating irrigation and cropping
schedules across the landscape has created a culturally rich
and ecologically productive system that is at least
1000-years-old (Lansing 2006). Importantly, the system
requires few inorganic inputs. Fields benefit from natural
fertilization as rainwater extracts minerals from volcanic
rock and the coordination of irrigation patterns prevents the
spread of pests, reducing the need for pesticides. Intrigu-
ingly, the nested institutions that coordinate irrigation and
cropping patterns align interests at different hierarchical
levels, a situation that has resulted in relatively
equitable yields for farmers in the same group (Lansing
2006; Lansing and Fox 2011). As a long-lived system with
clear group structure, rice production in Bali is an ideal
case for illustrating how the CMLS framework can inform
our understanding of the emergence and persistence of
social–ecological systems.
Extensive research has documented key components of
the system and produced critical insights into how it
functions (e.g., Lansing 1987, 2006; Schoenfedler 2001;
Scarborough et al. 1999). In addition, agent-based models
have been used to suggest a general mechanism through
which the system could have self-organized (Lansing and
Kremer 1993). However, gaining insight into how partic-
ular behaviors, organizational structures, and institutions
emerged and spread across the Balinese landscape has been
difficult in part due to the system’s longevity and gaps in
the written and archeological record. Given these data
limitations, we are compelled to rely on hypothetical sce-
narios to describe mechanisms operating at multiple scales
that could have contributed to the emergence and spread of
the system. We use two scenarios, supported where pos-
sible by direct evidence, to mirror the two primary schol-
arly arguments about the origins and management of the
system, one suggesting that Bali’s agro-ecological system
emerged from the bottom-up through a process of self-
organization (Lansing 2006) and the other suggesting that
it was historically shaped and controlled from the top-down
by royal elites (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003; Schulte Nordholt
2011). We conclude by outlining the data that would allow
us to test more fully the validity of the CMLS framework
for explaining this case and for understanding the structure
and dynamics of contemporary social–ecological systems.
Cultural multilevel selection framework
The CMLS framework derives from theories of cultural
evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985) and cultural group
selection (Henrich 2004). Cultural evolution is based on
evolutionary logic applied to cultural traits, which we
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define as socially transmitted behaviors, norms, beliefs,
attitudes, and institutions. This theory posits that individ-
uals learn strategically from others, preferentially copying
behaviors or attitudes from those whose traits appear to
confer an advantage (Mesoudi 2011). Differential imitation
acts as a form of natural selection, changing the prevalence
of cultural traits in a population over time. Through this
process, human behaviors and institutions co-evolve with
the local environment.
Individual imitation, however, cannot always explain the
spread of behaviors that are costly to the individual but
beneficial to the group, such as cooperation or other behav-
iors that are needed to solve social dilemmas. Cultural group
selection is a general theory that can explain the spread of
cooperative behaviors (Henrich 2004;Richerson et al. 2016).
When clearly defined groups vary in a trait that affects their
success, selection can act to favor groups exhibiting a group-
beneficial trait even if this trait is costly to individuals (Boyd
and Richerson 2009). For instance, a large company whose
employees work unselfishly might earn more business than
another company whose selfish employees compete with
each other, even though employees in the first company
sacrifice individual success in the process. Through this
mechanism, individually costly but group-beneficial
behaviors can persist and spread (Richerson et al. 2016).
The CMLS framework suggests that group-beneficial
behaviors will be favored when selection pressures between
groups are stronger than selection pressures among indi-
viduals. Group selection is most likely to act on a group-
beneficial trait (i.e., cooperation), thus resulting in the spread
of the trait among groups, when: (1) the trait produces group-
level benefits that exceed individual costs, (2) there is greater
variation in expression of the trait among groups than within
groups, and (3) the proliferation (or decline) of the trait is
directly related to the outcomes it produces (Price 1972;
Rogers 1990).
Derived from these principles, the application of the
CMLS framework to an environmental dilemma should
specify: the individual-level costs and group-level benefits
associated with a potentially relevant group-beneficial
cultural trait and the group structure and group-level vari-
ation in trait expression (Waring et al. 2015). Moreover,
the history and dynamics of selection pressures can help us
grasp trait emergence and spread. We outline these com-
ponents of Bali’s agro-ecological system below.
Balinese agro-ecology: the subak as a response
to social dilemmas
Decades of research have uncovered a set of highly ritu-
alized institutions that have helped Balinese farmers solve
the social dilemmas associated with managing water and
coordinating cropping patterns for the sustainable produc-
tion of rice. At the base of this set of institutions are subaks,
or associations of farmers who own land irrigated by a
common water source (Lansing 2006) (see Fig. 1). Subaks
are nested within regional water networks, which contain
water temples located at periodic nodes near the rivers and
irrigation channels that weave across the island. Local
water temples are subordinated to regional water temples
such that the cultural practices that facilitate coordination
are reflected in a nested hierarchy of farmers groups and
water temples (Lansing 2006).
The maintenance of this sustainable system in Bali
requires collective action. Decisions about water use and
cropping patterns constitute a social dilemma. Each farmer
has an incentive to withdraw as much water as possible to
maximize yields (Scarborough et al. 1999), yet unrestricted
water use by upstream farmers can lead to downstream
water scarcity. However, if farmers irrigate at different
times to reduce water stress, the resulting mosaic of wet
and dry fields allows pests (insects and rodents) and plant
diseases to thrive. Coordinating periods of flood and fallow
over a sufficiently large area deprives pests of food and
habitat, but it requires farmers to share water so planting
can occur at the same time upstream and downstream.
Thus, cooperation and coordination are needed to balance
individual water needs for rice growth with the strategic
use of water to prevent pests from spreading.
The CMLS framework applied to subaks
Here, we describe the costs and benefits of two interrelated
cultural traits that might generate group benefits. The first
trait, synchronized cropping, is a cooperative trait expres-
sed at the individual-level. The second trait, a complex of
institutions, rituals, and rites associated with subaks and
regional water temples, is expressed at the group-level
(Smaldino 2014).
Trait 1: synchronized cropping
The two main ecological constraints for rice production in
Bali, water scarcity and pest damage, can be overcome by
adopting either a staggered or a synchronized cropping
pattern. When water is limited, it is in the best interest of
upstream and downstream farmers to stagger their cropping
(Lansing and Miller 2005) to spread peak water demand
over a larger period of time. However, when pest damage is
the greater threat to yields, it is in the best interest of both
farmers to synchronize their cropping so that fields are
flooded and fallowed at roughly the same time.
Both cropping strategies require collective action.
Indeed, the individual costs and benefits of these strategies
Sustain Sci (2018) 13:35–47 37
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have been described as a two-player game-theoretic prob-
lem that is best solved when the upstream and downstream
farmers coordinate their actions (Lansing and Miller 2005).
Presumably because pest damage is a greater threat to
yields than water stress in Bali (Scarborough et al. 1999),
synchronization is the most common cropping pattern
(Janssen 2007; Lansing and Kremer 1993). So, we focus on
this variant of the trait for the remainder of the paper.
Trait 2: institutions, rites, and rituals
The second cultural trait is the set of institutions, rites, and
rituals that govern water use and influence collective
action. Formal institutions and complex religious rituals are
important in Bali for minimizing free-riding (water theft),
facilitating coordination and collective action, and pro-
viding a cultural foundation for maintaining group
solidarity.
Formal institutions, i.e., subaks, are important for
reducing water theft and maintaining infrastructure. The
existence of upstream and downstream farmers within a
group as well as upstream and downstream groups of
farmers creates the incentive for individual farmers to free-
ride (Lansing and Miller 2005). An individual upstream
farmer can take more than his fair share of water because
such cheating will have little impact on the downstream
group (or on pest populations) provided that the remaining
upstream farmers share. Lansing (2006: 67) notes that
‘‘…farmers in the upper subaks admit that they are often
tempted to take a little more water. But such cheating is
rare and usually occurs only in the tiny canals…’’ To
minimize cheating, subaks use fines and other penalties to
sanction infractions such as stealing water and missing
subak meetings or work assignments. The existence of
more severe penalties like having one’s water supply cut
off or being expelled from the subak altogether (Lansing
2006) might reflect the historical existence of more sub-
stantial forms of cheating.
Perhaps more important for maintaining group disci-
pline, however, is the intricate complex of rites and rituals
that have developed around the water temples. These rites
and rituals are examples of group-level traits ‘‘…not
expressed by any single individual in the group, but
(which) emerge from the structured organization of dif-
ferent individuals’’ (Smaldino 2014: 244). Importantly,
rituals, institutions, and the maintenance of water temples
can entail significant time and effort and impose a heavy
financial burden on households (Lansing 2006). As Lansing
(2006: 126) notes, ‘‘Assembling the many varieties of
offerings needed for the annual round of agricultural rites,
to take just one example, imposes a relentless series of
obligations on households…’’
While some rites and rituals play a direct role in coor-
dinating cropping (Lansing 1987, 2006), others have a
more symbolic meaning, facilitating group solidarity and
cooperation (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008; Watson-Jones
and Legare 2016). The internalization of the ritual aspects
of a system can reduce the need for costly enforcement and
sanctioning (Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Sosis 2009;
Sosis and Bressler 2003). These public displays address the
Fig. 1 Organizational structure.
Simplified diagram of the
organizational structure for
coordinating wet-rice
cultivation in Bali from the
bottom-up perspective.
Individual farmers plant and
harvest their own crops.
Farmers are clustered in subaks,
which coordinate cropping
among households sharing the
same water source. Subaks are
clustered in regional water
networks, which coordinate
cropping patters among them
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challenges that the pursuit of self-interest can pose for a
system that is so dependent on cooperation and coordina-
tion. Lansing (2006: 195) suggests that rituals also play a
cognitive role by helping individuals transcend personal
limitations and by instilling, ‘‘… a state of mind that
is…different from that of Homo economicus.’’ As Lansing
(2006: 136) writes, the purpose of the ritual displays is to
help contain individual desires by ‘‘…mobilizing the
powers of the collective to gain control…’’ (p. 137). These
rituals address the very tension between individual self-
interest and the good of the group that lies at the heart of
understanding the evolution of cooperation.
Organizational structure of the system
In this section, we examine how these two traits may have
emerged and spread at multiple scales.
Three levels of social organization are important: (1)
farmers/households, which are nested within (2) subaks,
which are nested within (3) regional water networks (see
Fig. 1). Whether farmers own, rent, or work farmland, they
generally retain rights to what they produce (Lansing 2006)
and bear the costs associated with synchronized cropping
(i.e., sharing water, maintaining irrigation infrastructure,
participating in and contributing resources to water temple
rituals). Farmers are clustered into subaks, which can
occupy 4 ha to over 800 ha (Scarborough et al. 1999) and
include 50–400 farmers, frequently from different villages
(Schoenfedler, 2001). Subaks coordinate cropping patterns
and irrigation sequences and organize farmers to construct
and maintain irrigation infrastructure (Lansing 1987).
Subaks are an important first unit for regulating farmers’
behavior, but they are then clustered within regional water
networks. One level of this network is an Ulun Swi temple,
which serves several subaks whose canals are filled by a
common weir or spring. Multiple Ulun Swi temples can be
nested under Masceti temples, which unite a dozen or more
subaks occupying a common stretch of river (Scarborough
et al. 1999) (see Fig. 1). Finally, the main water temple,
Pura Ulun Danu Batur sits at the edge of the volcanic lake
that is the source of irrigation water for much of Bali
(Scarborough et al. 1999). At this temple, priests arbitrate
disputes and give approval and advice for the construction
of new irrigation channels and tunnels. Subak members are
summoned to this temple annually, where they make
offerings to the water gods and receive guidance about
when to start planting (Lansing 1987). While initial coor-
dination occurs at the Pura Ulun Danu Batur temple, fur-
ther coordination to synchronize planting times among
member subaks occurs at Ulun Swi and Masceti temples at
annual meetings of the elected subak leaders (Lansing
1987, 2006; Schoenfedler 2001). Thus, just as farmers
cooperate and coordinate with other farmers within a
subak, subaks also cooperate and coordinate with other
subaks in the regional water network (Lansing 2006). The
nested levels of decision making mirror the nested levels of
physical irrigation works.
Lansing (2006: chapter 2) combines his own observa-
tions and ethnographic data with historic and archeological
data (e.g., Scarborough et al. 1999) to convincingly argue
that rice cultivation began in simple concave depressions,
but increased in complexity to include large-scale coordi-
nation among the thousands of farmers in the region. In the
first millennium A.D., Balinese farmers created channels
and dug tunnels to irrigate terraced paddies on hillocks or
‘‘water mountains’’. These engineered irrigation works
required cooperation and coordination at increasingly lar-
ger scales as they connected villages downstream. As
Lansing (2006: 42) writes:
‘‘These systems of water control became more com-
plex as new hillocks are added downstream. While a
single water mountain is typically managed by
farmers from one or two villages, several water
mountains are often tethered to one or more irrigation
systems, creating the need for water management at a
larger scale.’’
We suggest that the CMLS framework allows us to
understand the emergence and growth of this system as the
result of a shift in the dominant level of selection. When
the dominant level of selection (e.g., group selection) is
above the level of the social dilemma (e.g., individual
farmers sharing water) selection can favor group-beneficial
traits (Waring et al. 2015).
The emergence of synchronized cropping, subaks,
and associated rituals
While scholars (Lansing and Kremer 1993; Lansing et al.
2009) have modeled the emergence of clusters of syn-
chronizing subaks (regional water networks), these models
are based on the assumption that synchronized cropping
and subaks already exist. But, there is little explanation for
how synchronized cropping, subaks, or the institutions and
rituals associated with subaks, emerged and spread. The
CMLS framework suggests that selection for individually
beneficial behaviors (e.g., withdraw as much water as I
need) can operate at the same time, and in opposition to,
selection for group-beneficial behaviors (e.g., share water
and coordinate with other farmers in my subak). Based on
the emergence of clear group structures and variation in the
adoption of group-beneficial traits, cultural group selection
could have become a stronger force and shaped the Bali-
nese agro-ecological system. In the sections below, we use
a hypothetical, but reasonable scenario to imagine how the
Sustain Sci (2018) 13:35–47 39
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dominant level of selection may have changed, how group
structures may have emerged, and how cultural group
selection mechanisms could have resulted in the spread of
key cultural traits.
Level of selection: farmers
Farming on Bali began between 4500 and 3000 years ago
and farming communities and rice cultivation are estimated
to have been present approximately 2600 years ago
(Scarborough et al. 1999; Lansing 2006). As the area
converted to paddy, cultivation increased, irrigation
infrastructure expanded, and farmers faced the ecological
constraints of water stress and growing pest populations
(Lansing and de Vet 2012; Schoenfedler 2001). In the very
early stages of Balinese agriculture, the dominant level of
behavioral selection would likely have been the individual.
Self-interested strategies would have been selected for
because individuals who withdrew the most water would
have produced higher yields and outcompeted those who
did not.1
Level of selection: subaks
For group selection pressures to be stronger than individual
selection pressures multiple groups must exist and there
must be greater variation in the expression of a beneficial
trait among groups than within them (Henrich 2004). To
consider how selection pressures may have shifted to the
group-level to favor group-beneficial traits, imagine a small
group of farmers, who shared a water source. These
farmers may have previously worked together to build and
maintain small-scale irrigation infrastructure, which could
have facilitated coordination efforts. Based on local
knowledge about pest populations and expectations about
the benefits of synchronization, this small group might
have agreed to synchronize their cropping (see Fig. 2a).
Alternatively, synchronization could have emerged ‘‘by
accident’’ if several farmers independently copied the
cropping pattern of a neighboring farmer who had pro-
duced the highest yield the previous year. (see Lansing
et al. (2017) for a model of such a process) Given the
autonomy over their agricultural practices (Lansing 2006;
MacRae and Arthawiguna 2011), if synchronized cropping
generated greater yields for farmers than they had experi-
enced prior to synchronization, there would have been an
incentive to continue synchronizing. The resulting group
would have represented the earliest subak.
Other nearby farmers’ groups could have converged
independently on synchronization or they could have
developed other strategies for collectively managing pests
and water. As long as individuals or groups were forming
and experimenting this way, the landscape would have
become populated with diverse strategies for water and
pest management (Fig. 2a). This group-level variation is a
necessary condition for cultural group selection.
As subaks developed and grew, the costs of coordination
the incentives to free-ride would have grown as well,
favoring the emergence and evolution of the rituals and
institutions that we know today. Just as groups of farmers
varied in their cropping patterns, there may also have been
variation in the type and efficacy of institutions and rituals
that emerged alongside them. If particular institutions or
practices resulted in higher yields, they also could have
been favored by cultural group selection. Indeed, there is
evidence of variation in groups’ cropping strategies as well
as in the institutions and rituals that emerged to facilitate
collective action within the groups. For instance, Lansing
(2006) writes that there ‘‘…was considerable variation in
the ways that subaks governed themselves. Each subak was
free to construct its own institutions and there was no
external pressure to conform to a standard model’’ (p. 89).
Furthermore ‘‘…the amounts of time and treasure devoted
to these religious activities vary widely (among subaks)…’’
(p. 125). This variation also translated into different yields.
For instance, Lansing (2006: 114) describes one dysfunc-
tional subak whose ‘‘…harvests were dwindling…because
the irrigation schedules were very disorganized’’.
We do not want to imply that all subaks were con-
verging on a single ‘‘ideal’’ set of institutions and rituals
with identical components and organizational structures.
Instead, several factors could maintain variation among
subaks. For instance, complex institutions may be difficult
to fully understand, leading to copying errors (Boyd and
Richerson 2002; Nelson and Winter 1982) and spatial or
temporal variation in local ecological and/or social condi-
tions could lead to the development of slightly different
institutional structures or rituals (Boyd and Richerson
2010; Smaldino 2014). Additionally, groups could continue
to learn and experiment with new structures or features to
improve overall outcomes (Boyd and Richerson 2010),
Indeed, Lansing (2006: 89) refers to subaks as ‘‘ongoing
experiments’’ and MacRae and Arthawiguna (2011) pro-
vide direct evidence of such experimentation. Just as
continued variation within biological populations does not
mean that selection is inactive, continued variation among
groups does not mean group selection is inactive.
1 There can be a high degree of genetic relatedness within and
between subaks (Lansing et al. 2009), supported by endogamous
marriage (Lansing 2006). Therefore, kin-selection may partially
explain levels of cooperation. However, villages vary in their degree
of genetic relatedness (Lansing et al. 2009), and subaks have been
described fragile institutions prone to breakdown despite interactions
among kin (Lansing 2006). Moreover, the extent of cooperation and
coordination required across the system likely goes beyond that which
can be explained by kin selection alone (Henrich 2004).
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Cultural group selection mechanisms
Before we outline the potential emergence and spread of
higher level water networks, it is important to consider the
cultural transmission mechanisms (Henrich 2004; Richer-
son et al. 2016) that might have increased the prevalence of
the group-beneficial traits noted above. Although the
strength of evidence varies, each of the processes outlined
below could have facilitated the spread of synchronization
and the associated rituals and institutions.
Differential migration
Group-beneficial traits can increase in a population if
individuals leave unsuccessful groups and migrate to
groups that produce higher yields, adopting the norms and
practices of the group when they arrive. Farmers might
have been selective about where to establish their fields or
could have moved residences, favoring locations with
higher productivity as a result of synchronized cropping
and effective institutions. Such movement would increase
the prevalence of these traits in the population. While
plausible, there is little evidence of such movement, in part
because the mosaic of property rights (Lansing 2006)
might have limited the ability of, or opportunity for,
farmers to move to new land.
Demographic expansion, competition, and group
extinction
Reasonably assuming that greater yields support higher
population growth, groups with synchronized cropping and
effective institutions and rituals would have produced
higher yields, supporting higher fertility. More rapid pop-
ulation growth could have lead to the establishment of new
communities with the same cultural traits (Fig. 2b). Lans-
ing et al. (2009) use genetic evidence to suggest that new
subaks were created when demographic pressure forced
a
b
d
c
e
f
Fig. 2 Group formation and cultural transmission mechanisms.
Diagram a represents the emergence of groups with different cropping
strategies, institutions, and rituals. Diagrams b–f represent mecha-
nisms through which the traits of synchronized cropping and/or
institutions and rituals could increase in the population. Diagrams b–
f illustrate the proliferation of the trait and should be viewed in
reference to the starting condition in diagram a
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descendants from growing villages to establish new set-
tlements (and subaks) downstream. Farmers in these new
subaks would likely have maintained synchronized crop-
ping and the rituals and institutions from their ‘‘parent’’
community as a form of group-level vertical transmission.
Moreover, groups that obtain higher yields should also
have more resources, allowing them to outcompete other
groups. Direct competition, such as warfare, could lead to
the ‘‘extinction’’ of the cultural traits of the losing group
(Fig. 2c). While there is some evidence for competition
among subaks (Lansing 2006, Chapter 4) it does not
involve warfare. Instead direct conflict and warfare appears
to have been much more common among royal families
and lords (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003; Lansing 2006) (see
below). However, subaks can experience ‘‘mortality’’ even
without direct external competition. For instance, Lansing
(2006) notes the complete collapse of a subak as a result of
poor leadership and lack of organization. The unique
components of that Subak’s institutions and rituals would
have been removed from the population upon its demise.
Prestige-biased transmission
Prestige-biased transmission, or imitation of successful
entities, could also have increased the prevalence of syn-
chronized cropping in the population. Imitation can occur
at the individual-level (Fig. 2d), with individuals copying
another farmer’s successful cropping pattern or the subak
level (Fig. 2e). In fact, Lansing et al. (2017) model the
emergence of synchronization among farmers and Lansing
and Kremer (1993) model a similar process among subaks
to illustrate this mechanism. In the latter case, each subak
checks the productivity of its four nearest neighboring
subaks and adopts the cropping pattern of the neighboring
subak with the highest yield. In as few as eight years, this
decision rule leads to relatively stable clusters of subaks
that have adopted the same cropping pattern (i.e. syn-
chronization). By copying the most-successful neighboring
group, subaks in the model increased their yields and
promoted the spread of the most-effective cropping pattern
for a particular location. Importantly, the clusters of syn-
chronizing subaks that emerged in the model closely mat-
ched the patterns observed empirically.
Level of selection: water temple networks
Using the model noted above, Lansing and Kremer (1993)
suggest that imitation of successful subaks can produce
adaptive regional water temple networks. However, even
as regional water networks form, there remains a group-
level social dilemma. While overall yields for a group of
ten subaks might be highest when all subaks share water,
the yield for any one subak might be higher if it cheated by
withdrawing more water than agreed upon. Therefore,
regional water networks also have mechanisms to punish
rule breaking, including levying fines and shutting off
water to an entire subak for a failure to fulfill its respon-
sibilities (Lansing 2006). Moreover, the scale of coordi-
nation at the network level is significantly higher as there is
now the need to ensure that guidance about crop varieties
and irrigation timing is disseminated to hundreds of
farmers across multiple subaks (Lansing and Kremer
1993).
Thus, institutional structures to facilitate cooperation
and coordination among subaks could be selected
(Fig. 2F). As multiple regional networks appear (structured
around Ulun Swi and Masceti temples) the dominant level
of selection (and the most important level of decision
making) can again shift upward. Like subaks, emerging
regional-level networks may have initially varied in the
strategies they adopted to enable cooperation and coordi-
nation and disseminate information. The networks with
institutions and rituals that best facilitated group-beneficial
traits could have produced the higher yields. If so, these
institutions and norms could have spread to other networks
through prestige-biased imitation or the other cultural
transmission mechanisms noted above (demographic
expansion, direct competition, and migration). Importantly,
these networks are adaptive in that the group of synchro-
nizing subaks can change in response to ecological con-
ditions. The scale of coordination required depends on
rainfall, pest populations, and other constraints that are
taken into account on an annual basis. Thus, in this system
selection pressures could have favored institutions with
mechanisms that would allow for quick response to chan-
ges in ecological conditions.
In the sections above, we have broadly outlined poten-
tial mechanisms for the spread of group-level traits.
Together, archeological data, ethnographic information,
and computer modeling support the explanation that the
rice cultivation system in Bali grew in complexity through
a process of cultural group selection operating at higher
scales of social organization. Providing more precise
details about how, and by whom, complex group-level
traits are transmitted is more difficult. There are examples
of groups that have imitated complex organizational
structures, institutions, and rituals (even if incompletely
and inaccurately) (Zefferman and Richerson 2014; Smal-
dino 2014; Norenzayan et al. 2016), but questions remain
about how such complex institutions are transmitted
between groups and this has been identified as an important
area for future research (Smaldino 2014).
Through this scenario, we described how synchronized
cropping could have first spread among subaks. Groups of
subaks that integrated their agricultural system with
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existing religious beliefs and practices or groups of subaks
in which cultural practices emerged in tandem with eco-
logical practices/outcomes could have had higher levels of
collective action. Then, as the number of subaks increased
and the gains for higher levels of coordination emerged (as
well as the threat of free-riding) another level of social
organization was required. The bundle of traits (synchro-
nization combined with religious institutions and practices)
that generated the highest group benefits relative to indi-
vidual costs could then have spread among regional net-
works through a number of cultural transmission
mechanisms.
Disruption in the level of selection: the nation
and the individual
While we relied on a hypothetical scenario in the previous
section, a recent event highlighted the impact of a change
in the level of selection on the structure and function of the
system. In the 1970s, the Indonesian government set a goal
of becoming a rice-exporting nation (Lansing 2006). To
accomplish this goal, Indonesia adopted green revolution
reforms including the distribution of improved rice vari-
eties and the heavy use of pesticides and agricultural
innovations developed in different cultural and ecological
contexts. Balinese farmers were told to ignore traditional
cropping patterns and to plant as often as possible and
those who did not adopt green revolution practices were
called backwards and unpatriotic (Lansing 2006). As
Indonesia began competing with other nations in global
rice markets, lower-level group affiliations, practices,
institutions, and rituals were weakened or abandoned.
The abandonment of the rituals, institutions, and norms
that promoted collective action shifted the level of selec-
tion down from the subak level to the individual. After a
few years of improved yields, farmers started suffering
high levels of crop damage by pests and disease, which
dramatically reduced both individual and overall rice pro-
ductivity (Lansing 2006). Thus, centralized decision mak-
ers promoted technology and practices that ignored
important group structures, institutions and rituals and were
maladaptive in Bali’s ecological and cultural context. In
the intervening years, the system has largely reverted to
traditional practices.
CMLS and the top-down perspective on water
management
The argument that the system for water management in
Bali emerged as a process of self-organization is well
supported with a range of compelling evidence. However,
other scholars have suggested that the system was histori-
cally controlled and shaped from the top-down by royal
elites (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003; Schulte Nordholt 2011).
While a full review of the evidence for both perspectives is
beyond the scope of this paper, we argue that the CMLS
framework can also be used to understand how such a
system could have emerged through top-down forces and
selection pressures.
Some scholars have argued that kings, lords, and
members of the nobility were directly involved in water
management and the construction and maintenance of
dams (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003; Schulte Nordholt 2011).
Politics and religion were closely connected and water
temples were described as political tools that could be
harnessed by royal families (Hauser-Scha¨ublin
2003, 2005). Kings organized rituals, made decisions about
water use and distribution, and adjudicated disputes among
subaks. In addition, regional water networks were linked to
powerful clans and nobility nested within regencies who
competed for the allegiance of villages (Hauser-Scha¨ublin
2003). From this top-down perspective, the most prominent
group structures and, subsequently, the key levels of
selection, would have been: (1) nine regencies, each con-
trolled by a king, (2) territories embedded within these
regencies and controlled by lords and noble families, (3)
subaks within territories, (4) villages within subaks, and (5)
individuals within villages (see Fig. 3, individuals not
pictured).
A king’s authority was derived from his ability to
command subjects to join an annual pilgrimage to honor
important deities (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003, 2005). These
pilgrimages made visible the boundaries of the regencies
and territories and provided an indicator of the size of the
population that was loyal to a lord or king (Hauser-
Scha¨ublin 2003). The pilgrimages also strengthened social
bonds and a sense of community (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2005),
which can be important for collective action. Allegiance to
a king was partly based on the degree to which he was
perceived to channel the power of the gods to ensure the
fertility of the populace and their crops (Hauser-Scha¨ublin
2003, 2005). A king’s power thus reflected the productivity
of the fields under his control and, by extension, wise water
management. High yields would strengthen the allegiance
of subjects to their ruler and provide greater tax revenue
and contributions towards important rites and rituals. Lords
and nobles would have been similarly motivated to manage
water and cropping patterns to maximize overall yields
because they competed with each other for lands, the
allegiance of peasant farmers, and the favor of the king.
Unfortunately, there is little discussion in this literature
about how top-down control of irrigation emerged. It is
unlikely that kings actively developed this complex system
from scratch given the layered, system-wide understanding
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that this would have required (Pedersen 2005). Instead, we
can imagine another hypothetical scenario that begins with
a small group of farmers experimenting with synchronized
cropping and that grows to the point of being harnessed by
the governing groups that are incentivized to ensure the
highest yields among their subjects.
The same cultural group-selection mechanisms outlined
above would apply to each level in the hierarchy here.
Subaks, territories and regencies where synchronization
was common could have grown more rapidly (demographic
expansion), attracted more households (migration), been
imitated by other groups (prestige-biased transmission), or
outcompeted other groups (direct competition/warfare). In
addition, because lords and kings had an incentive to
identify practices that increased yields, they could have
actively promoted the spread of synchronized planting
across subaks, territories, and/or the regency under their
control (akin Durham’s (1991) concept of ‘imposition’).
In the top-down narrative, direct inter-group competi-
tion among royal families, lords, and powerful clans would
likely have been a more important driving force for cultural
evolution. Kings and lords would have competed for the
allegiance of villages and the productive land they worked.
Rulers who managed irrigation water and who harnessed
the power of religion and ritual would have been more
effective at generating cooperation within and among
subaks and would thus have earned greater tax revenue
from the higher yields of subaks they controlled. The tax
revenue could have been used to field stronger armies or to
win status races. A growing population would have
increased the need for agricultural land, which could have
contributed to inter-group competition and warfare. For
instance, Hauser-Scha¨ublin (2003) refers to several early
studies on Bali that indicate frequent conflict and warfare.
In addition, Lansing (2006: 57) writes, ‘‘The main area for
conflict was the southern rice bowl of Bali, where by the
eighteenth century little kingdoms appeared and disap-
peared on the time scale of decades.’’ More productive
regencies would have earned higher tax revenues and had
more resources and a larger population upon which to draw
in times of war (Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003, 2005), allowing
them to outcompete other lords.
In short, the CMLS framework can still inform the
argument that subaks were not completely autonomous and
independent of top-down control by kings. Using the
CMLS framework to differentiate between the two argu-
ments requires identifying (1) which group structures are
most relevant by determining the groups (subaks or terri-
tories) farmers most strongly identify with, and (2) which
transmission mechanisms are most relevant. While there is
Fig. 3 Group structure from the top-down perspective. Simplified
diagram of the organizational structure for coordinating wet-rice
cultivation in Bali from the top-down perspective. Subaks can include
multiple villages, exist within territories and regencies, and are
controlled by lords and kings
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more compelling evidence in support of the bottom-up
perspective on the emergence of subaks (see commentary
in Hauser-Scha¨ublin 2003; Lansing 2005; Lansing and de
Vet 2012; Pedersen 2005), it is not necessary to adopt an
either/or perspective (Pedersen 2005) or presume that
bottom-up and top-down forces acted independently. Pre-
senting both arguments allows us to demonstrate how the
CMLS framework informs both explanations by treating
top-down and bottom-up pressures not as categories, but as
forces that influence the likelihood that key behaviors will
be adopted by, for instance, altering the costs and benefits
of those behaviors.
Discussion and conclusion
We have applied the CMLS framework to a well-known,
complex social–ecological system to show how the
framework can be used to understand the emergence and
persistence of a sustainable social–ecological system. To
this end we combined evidence from the literature with
hypothetical scenarios to discuss: (1) the emergence of
group structure, (2) variation in cropping strategies, insti-
tutions, and rituals adopted by groups, (3) how variation in
yields as a result of different strategies, institutions, and
rituals could have created the conditions for group selec-
tion pressures to outweigh individual selection pressures,
and (4) the cultural transmission mechanisms that can
explain the spread of group-beneficial traits. We also note
that Lansing’s description of the function of water temples
and rituals mirrors the persistent tension between individ-
ual self-interest and group-level benefits.
In applying this framework, we also sought to demon-
strate how the CMLS framework complements previous
explanations for the emergence of the Balinese system.
Lansing and colleagues have provided convincing evidence
that groups of farmers, water temples, and associated
decision-making institutions in Bali constitute a complex
adaptive system (CAS) that emerged through a process of
self-organization (Lansing 2006). To complement the CAS
perspective, the CMLS framework provides insights into
specific cultural transmission mechanisms that can explain
the role selection played in the development of increasingly
complex structures. Several scholars have noted that, rather
than being in conflict, CAS and evolutionary theory are
complementary, in part because attention to selection
pressures is needed to understand the development of
increasingly complex structures (Hodgson and Knudsen
2010; Kauffman 1993; Levin 1998). For instance, Hodgson
and Knudsen (2010: 55) write, ‘‘self-organization explains
neither the characteristics of the elements that interact to
create the emergent order, nor how the emergent order
adapts and survives in the broader environment’’. In the
Balinese case, it is important to remember that there are
still selection pressures acting on individual farmers within
subaks and shaping group structures over time.
The CMLS framework is agnostic about sustainability.
It does not suggest that, given enough time, cultural evo-
lution will necessarily promote long-lasting social–eco-
logical systems. Forces from multiple levels of
organization may not push in the same direction in all
systems or at all times. The green revolution era was evi-
dence of this in Bali, and external forces and/or internal
policies have shifted the dominant level of selection in
deleterious ways in other systems (see examples in Waring
et al. 2015). Instead the value of CMLS is that it provides a
framework for examining the impact that particular poli-
cies or interventions, understood as driving forces of
change, can have on a system and whether they are likely
to result in more cooperation or more self-interested
behavior.
Importantly, our analysis is necessarily retrospective.
We have relied on published historical, ethnographic and
archeological data and logic to surmise how this system
might have emerged and spread. However, the CMLS
framework can also be prospective; it can be used to ana-
lyze current trends and develop hypotheses, as other papers
in this special issue illustrate (Kline et al., Hillis et al.). If
we could study the system as it was first emerging and
evolving, we would focus on several pieces of evidence
about the relative costs and benefits of different agricultural
practices, the salience of different group structures, and
other important aspects of the system. Using the example
of Bali’s agro-ecological systems, we conclude by high-
lighting the data that would be required to fully test
hypotheses derived from the CMLS framework about the
evolution of social–ecological systems:
• Measures of the perceived individual costs and indi-
vidual and group-level benefits of synchronized crop-
ping relative to other cropping patterns and water
management strategies (i.e., staggered planting). This
should be done for different farmers in different
communities (upstream versus downstream) and in
years with different ecological conditions (high vs. low
rainfall and high vs. low pest threat). Information on
perceived net benefits at different scales could then be
used to determine the likelihood that group selection
pressures will be stronger than individual ones and
whether a group-beneficial trait can spread as a result.
• Information on the salience of group identities and the
degree to which the subak is the most important social
group for farmers (particularly in comparison to the
territory or regency in which a farmer lives). Because
individuals can belong to multiple social groups
simultaneously (i.e., a kin group, a village, a subak,
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and a regional water network), data that sheds light on
the salience of these groups in particular contexts can
illuminate whether group selection pressures are likely
to act on that group. If farmers note that being part of a
subak is more important socially than identifying with
where they live, then group selection pressures would
be more likely to operate on the subak than on the
village or territory.
• Measures of variation in synchronized cropping and
correlations between synchronization and agricultural
productivity among subaks as well as measures of the
degree of variation within groups versus between
groups. Group selection pressures are more likely to
operate on traits if there is variation among groups in
the expression of those traits and that variation is highly
correlated with rice productivity.
• Information on the mechanisms for monitoring and
enforcing water use and water use agreements, the
frequency of water theft, and the costs of punishment.
This data could indicate the degree of conflict and
competition among groups as well as the individual and
group-level costs of maintaining cooperation.
• Measures of geographic variation in water availability
and other ecological and topographic features that may
relate to expression of the cultural trait, salient group
identities, and institutional features (e.g., irrigation
infrastructure, water temple rituals and ceremonies)
related to water management.
• Tracking different cultural group selection mechanisms
by examining social interactions across groups that
could facilitate social learning and imitation, levels of
competition among groups, migration patterns, and
variation in population growth rates.
Historical reinterpretations of the type presented here
provide an important first step in clarifying the important
features and causal mechanisms that should receive close
attention in the future. However, empirical work will be
needed for more direct examination of the value and
validity of the CMLS framework for understanding how
sustainable social–ecological systems emerge, persist, and
spread.
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